

# TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT CAN CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO PEACE AND PROSPERITY

***Jordan, Indus, Zambezi, Nile and Limpopo River  
Basins***

Presented by  
Ele-Jan Saaf  
Belynda Petrie

# Overview

- Introduction
- Transboundary River Basin Management
- Core strengths
- Examples and needs
- Conclusion

# Introduction

- African continent has the highest number of shared river basins in the world (64), containing more than 93% of its surface water
- A number of international agreements have been established to facilitate cooperative management of the resource & minimise inter state conflict – effectiveness is a concern
- CC is further stressing a stressed resource with wide spread impacts on critical sectors
- Establishing international agreements has been a core occupation, but is this ambition preventing us from cooperating in other ways?
- Once agreements are established they often prove hard to alter (Lake Victoria)

# Transboundary River Basin Management

- Makes use of modern insights into water resources management (virtual water, hydro-hegemony and the economic values of water ecosystems)
- Contributes significantly to peace and prosperity between rivaling countries or regions
  - Partly also through increasing resilience to climate change

# The core strengths of transboundary river basin management

- 1) The prerequisite for all riparians to sit at the same table and to share data on water resources within the river basin
- 2) The requirement for all riparians to share at least generic plans for development of the water resources for whatever services they have in mind (irrigation, water supply, hydropower, industry, etc.)

# The core strengths of transboundary river basin management

- 3) Recognition of water rights and/or needs by all parties
- 4) Development of joint management plans and institutions that bring all parties closer together and can foster a platform for further cooperation
- 5) Explicit recognition of the positive attributes of transboundary/regional cooperation through benefit sharing whilst still safeguarding national interests

# Strengths and weaknesses of various types of water agreements within river basins

# Jordan River


- Only an agreement with Jordan;
- Temporary agreements with PA through Oslo;
- Fixed quantitative allocations based on multi-year averages;
- Problems with reductions in flow of Yarmouk and other Jordan River tributaries;
- No RBO of any kind (5 riparian countries)



# Indus Water Treaty

- Strong agreement;
- “Cutting” of the watershed;
- No fixed allocations needed as each gets what he gets;
- Problems with renewed interests in rivers “given” to other party (e.g. Baghlihar and Kishanganga);
- Strong arbitration but no RBO (no need).

# Zambezi Basin



- 8 Countries; Zambia = largest Beneficiary
- Difficult history of concluding agreement
- 7/8 countries signed in 2004
- ZAMCOM IS established in Botswana
- Inequitable Benefit Sharing
- No established data sharing protocol
- Inadequate understanding of the balance of power in the basin

# Nile Basin



- Little data sharing & hydrological information
- 10 countries; Egypt main Riparian State
- 2011- 5 countries signed NB Cooperative Framework Agreement in 2010; need 6 signatures
- Colonial treaties (1929 & 1959) gave Egypt veto rights
- High climate variability – frequent and intense floods and droughts
- Unilateral action demonstrates that shared management is critical – escalating tension, inequitable benefit sharing, different development agendas
- Nile Basin Initiative; NB Commission
- Political tensions are high

# Limpopo Basin



- Has “closed” basin status; high pollution levels
- Further stressed by CC and inequitable benefit sharing plus development at all costs
- Fixed but inequitable allocation
- LIMCOM Interim Secretariat established 2011
- 4 countries signed and ratified

# Conclusions

- More dynamic allocation models are required
- Serious WDM measures are mandatory
- Transboundary River Basin Organisations & agreements still not a source of ready made solutions to the governance of TB basins – need more “small” steps based on purpose-built cooperation
- Technical level cooperation is more “doable” than political
- Need to treat basins as integral and integrated systems – using the balance of power in a basin and its decision making is critical



# Conclusions

- Need to accelerate the pace of change substantially
- Pace of change needed usually crisis driven
- ***There are plenty crises to use to accelerate the pace – but how?***

# Conclusions - crisis catalyses change

---

CC poses particular threats to food security with multiple socio-economic impacts

World food stocks are at an all time low (droughts) – Price rises up to 20%

Recent history shows what can happen

- Bread price increases
- High reliance on food imports
- Violence saw the restoration of water and electricity subsidies – and reversal of bread prices



***Why? currency value decline;  
increase in global wheat prices – Russian drought***